VaultaryA separate secret
The current build uses a vault passphrase independent of the iPhone’s everyday passcode. A password-derived key wraps a random master key. Optional biometric convenience is opt-in. The app covers its interface when inactive and clears owned previews on lock; these lifecycle controls still require physical-device acceptance before release.
Authenticated encrypted storage
The development implementation uses system AES-256-GCM for file content and metadata, including names, collections and the library index. Large files are stored in authenticated chunks. PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 uses a versioned work factor of 600,000 rounds for the initial format. Algorithm names alone do not establish implementation security.
Files stay with you
The initial product is designed without a company media server or a company account. Apple services may still be involved in distribution and purchases. Offline use does not automatically create a backup.
Protection has limits
No product can promise protection against every compromised device, coercion or a copy you deliberately share. A screenshot, exported plaintext or source original exists outside the vault’s storage boundary. We will document supported formats and limits rather than claim universal protection.
Evidence before claims
Our release checklist includes failure-safe import, authenticated encryption tests, background privacy, clean-install archive restore and independent security review. That review has not been completed. We will publish verified implementation details and meaningful limitations with the release.